Introduction
Fifteen years ago in Argentina, if a high-level scandal broke on the pages of a Buenos Aires-based daily, chances are that it happened in the pages of Página/12, an upstart publication begun in the late 1980s that broke the mold of mainstream journalism in Latin America with its top-notch investigative reporting and irreverent prose. High-level political scandals blanketed front pages and permeated broadcast news, as Página/12 engaged in watchdog journalism, a form historically associated with the ideal of media as a mechanism for promoting accountability of those in positions of power by publishing information that other parties would want to keep secret (Aucoin, 2005; Rodriguez-Yebra, 2006; Waisbord, 2000 Waisbord, : xix, 2001 ). Media analysts lauded the newcomer and cited it as a salient example of how such reporting was jumping from alternative presses to the mainstream by the late 20th century in Latin America. Indeed, other 'watchdog' media outlets in Latin America were also investigating, documenting and scrutinizing elite behavior in order to raise awareness of corruption, ideally providing the public with enough information to maintain or enhance democratic quality (Waisbord, 2000) . These are vital roles in Latin America, where nascent democratic institutions have historically been weak, unstable and inconsistent. Unequal access to constitutional guarantees is a fact of life for many of the marginalized in Latin America, who form a signifi cant portion of the region's population.
In Argentina, watchdog journalism was becoming mainstream in a country that just a decade before had been mired in an especially brutal military regime, where state-sponsored terrorism was viewed as a legitimate means to stifl e expression. Página/12's popularity and style permeated the consciousness of other media organizations in Argentina, and other newspapers changed their format to include mocking headlines, large front-page images, and hardhitting investigations.
But somehow the Argentine watchdog press had lost its bite by 2005. Charges of ofi cialismo -adhering uncritically to the offi cial view -and selfcensorship had punctured the newspapers' credibility, and personnel ruptures over ownership affi liations and coverage decisions within media outlets and a related journalist association shook the media world. Claims of editorial subordination for organizational agendas were levied at mainstream media, and especially at Página/12.
Are the charges true? If so, what muzzled an emergent independent and assertive press, paradoxically after economic and political liberalization had theoretically 'freed' media from traditional authoritarian pressures? And what implications does the Argentine case hold for Latin American democratic media function? To understand why forms of journalism emerge or decline, I describe change through a lens of media content, then explain factors relevant to the change from interviews with Argentine media professionals and analysts.
This article is informed by nuanced studies positing that transformation of media performance is pushed by factors operating not only in media environments, but also the mechanics of organizational routines, ideologies, and relations with elite actors (Bresnahan, 2003; Hughes, 2006; León-Dermata, 2003; Rodriguez-Yebra, 2006; Tumber and Waisbord, 2004; Waisbord, 1994; . In Argentina, recent declines in watchdog performance refl ect transformation across media environments, media organizations, and journalistic practices and routines at the institutional level, and such transformations occurred for differing reasons. Spaces for autonomous reporting opened and then closed, as media economic and political environments were shaken by crisis. Yet environmental changes were not the only causes of change. Often forgotten in analyses of media performance are the internal newsroom factors, infl uenced by the particular interests of the media organization. The Argentine case presents compelling evidence that organizational and institutional variables interacted with changes in media economic and political environments to infl uence why media presented the content that they did. Organizational calculus favoring corporate interests, management ideologies or political affi nities pushed reporting in varying directions, given similar economic and political climates. Newsroom values rather than watchdog ones that favored either political ideological synchronicity or dissent formed dominant infl uences guiding reporting, as did organizational calculus to protect business interests.
To better perceive infl uences impacting media performance, I present a model to describe the impact of the emergent variables on watchdog media performance. The Argentine case represents an important instance of subordination of democratic media performance, in a context of democratic institutional reign and neo-liberal policies. It also provides a useful comparison for understanding media change in other democratizing states with economic and political instability, issues of weak journalistic professionalization, instrumental views of media, and collusive relations between media owners and power actors -trends witnessed in other Latin American nations and beyond (Hughes and Lawson, 2005; Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002; Hallin and Mancini, 2004; León-Dermata, 2003; Waisbord, 2000) 
Institutional theory
This study utilizes a perspective of news media as institutions, and media performance change as institutional change. After all, media are not simply individual organizations, but institutions: patterns of social behavior across organizations that endure over time and extend across space and govern a certain sector of society (Cook, 1998: 66-84; Hughes, 2006 Hughes, : 31, 2007 Scott, 1995: 18) . News media as institutions have regulative, normative and cognitive structures and activities that can shape behavior. Regulative structures determine rules that provide incentives for actors to comply. Normative values institutionalize internal systems of social awareness and acceptability, guiding decision-making processes. Cognitive elements of institutions operate at individual mental levels, working within complicated networks of schematic processing and parameters of meaning to develop accepted understandings of behavior (Hughes, 2006: 40-44; Scott, 1995: 33-45) .
Conceptualizing media as institutions is particularly useful when analytically considering how media performances change. Institutions can change as incentives shift or are altered, or values and norms transmute. An institutional perspective of incentives, preferences, and rules governing behaviors and shaping value systems is useful on several fronts. This type of perspective incorporates not only the preferences of government actors into the discussion, but also the effects of the organization of political systems, incentive structures and the 'rules of the game' (Scott, 1995) . Actors maneuvering within this institutional framework make choices based on the perceived benefi ts they will gain, the costs associated with other alternatives, and the dominant ideology or values of their organization (North, 1990) .
To understand why press coverage has changed, it is necessary to examine institutional change across regulative, normative and cognitive dimensions, and within a context of internal and external infl uences for change. When other organizations upon which media are dependent exert pressure, institutional change can occur and media performance changes. (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 67) . Institutional change can also occur as a result of cognitive and normative controls within media organizations, including logics such as correctness, convention, or instrumentality to guide decision making (Scott, 1995) . Media professionals act in certain ways because they perceive certain benefi ts if they do, that it is the appropriate course of action to take, or that it is the way things have always been done (Gill and Hughes, 2005; Hughes, 2006) .
From alternative to mainstream
Changes seen in watchdog reporting in mainstream media may be interpreted, therefore, as the result of organizations responding to external infl uences for change, such as crisis in media economies or changes in regulatory structures. But they may also result as consequences of internal change, as newsroom staff act within parameters of organizational ideologies and professional conventions in contexts of instability and uncertainty. The case of Argentina provides a useful case study of several press organizations -each with different organizational ideological leanings and varying histories of watchdog reporting -responding to similar changes in media economies, as well as a benchmark for other Latin American media in similar situations. This type of reporting has traditionally been maintained outside of the margins of mainstream media in much of the world. In Latin America's nascent democracies, where a blurred line has long existed between politics and journalism, publication of reporting on illicit acts of powerful actors has met with formidable obstacles and media-state relations were often forged in environments of institutional instability, political upheaval, and economic uncertainty. Mainstream media performance, rather than functioning in a watchdog manner, were often hybrid forms of partisan, commercial, or authoritarian media models. 1 Therefore, if the charges of content shifts are true, the disappearance of watchdog reporting from mainstream Argentine media content would be in some ways as stunning as its emergence. In Argentina, as elsewhere in Latin America, media were alternately subject to various forms of direct and indirect controls throughout decades of institutional instability. Government offi cials and other power actors directly and indirectly co-opted media organizations, in the name of national security or national unity. Media formed strategic alliances with political actors, for ideological adhesion, or to meet organizational goals. Indeed, market-driven media had signifi cant incentives to develop strategic relations with powerful actors, because their political and economic environments refl ected 'a Hobbesian world of extreme uncertainty, short time horizons, and low levels of trust and cooperation' (Levitsky and Murillo, 2005: 21) . As Waisbord (2000: 17) notes, 'the power of the press meant proximity to, not distance from, the state. ' For much of the 20th century, watchdog journalism was largely regulated to alternative outlets (Waisbord, 2000: 26) . But a critical juncture for watchdog journalism emerged with the shift to democracy in 1983 and economic liberalization by the early 1990s, as broadcast and print media moved from being directly under state control, or subject to direct state repression, to being largely under market controls. Suddenly, massive deregulation and privatization of state industries, and a shift to a market economy had relaxed the grip of the state over media by allowing a thriving private sector to develop. The dependency on state monies and constraint of heavy state regulation infrastructures had lessened dramatically in scope. Technological innovation and relaxed regulation allowed for international forces to enter the market, sparking even fi ercer competition (Johnson, 2003: 440-441) .
In this environment, watchdog media jumped from alternative and marginalized sectors of the media to the mainstream. Change agents committed to providing a voice for traditionally muted voices in the mainstream not only found the political climate amenable to diverse viewpoints, but also found a public hungering for the kind of accountability that watchdog reporting could bring. The public success and prestige garnered by muckracking organizations permeated the consciousness of other outlets. At the same time media gained in importance in determining elections, traditional mechanisms of political communication -such as unions and political parties -were fading, and politicians were taking notice (Levitsky, 2003; Waisbord, 2000) . Strategic leaks played out in the press and served as springboards for media investigations.
Such investigations and publications were certainly not easy to achieve. Journalists' access to high-level information was often contingent upon maintaining 'friendly' relations with high-level sources, as other avenues for obtaining information were limited. A lack of public record infrastructure and a hollow legal framework in Latin America to permit access to offi cial records forces journalists to rely on elite sources, or encourages forms of rent-seeking behaviors (Hughes and Lawson, 2005; Waisbord, 2000) .
Other environmental conditions had implications for the effi cacy of watchdog reporting. The economic and political crises of 2001 in Argentina deeply undermined the prospects for watchdog reporting in the mainstream news, as media companies struggled to avoid fi nancial ruin and maintain a foothold in the industry. As an economic recession slid rapidly into a crisis situation by the turn of the 21st century, media organizations and groups again turned to state aid for debt bailout. Currency devaluations substantially increased the external debt of media companies that had been expanding their communication empires, and increased their dependence on state advertising monies (Hughes, 2006) . At the same time the private sector collapsed, government advertising in media sharply increased. Because the allotment of government advertising is largely subjective, with no discernable objective and consistently applied criteria, critics have decried offi cial advertising spending as 'rewarding' and 'punishing' positive and negative media coverage (Aguilar, 2006; Gallo, 2004a Gallo, , 2004b Gallo, , 2006 .
2 While the larger media conglomerates only receive a fraction of their revenue from government advertising, this arbitrary system has severe implications for smaller outlets and provincial newspapers. A study done by the Argentine Association of Civil Rights found that this mechanism of control has had negative repercussions on press freedom in several of Argentina's provinces, with instances occurring of government payoffs for positive coverage in the form of overpayment for advertising space; acknowledgments that advertising revenue means editorial control by political actors and media professionals; and even instances where electricity was cut to stations that did not comply (ADC Report, 2005) .
How and why has change occurred? To fi rst understand media change, I examine content in two major Argentine dailies, La Nación and Clarín, and compare them to Página/12 in order to understand how watchdog performance has shifted. Then, I present the fi ndings from interviews with Argentine media managers, media analysts, and working investigative journalists and editors to understand what factors have infl uenced the emergence or decline of watchdog reporting.
Content analysis design and inquiry

I used largely qualitative measures to analyze latent dimensions in content.
Watchdog reporting was conceptualized as being formed largely of two dimensions: autonomy, or the degree to which news organizations were free to critically cover powerful actors and assertiveness, or the ability of the newsroom to seek out multiple sources of information and report on topics of their choosing. These conceptualizations were developed based on Waisbord's (2000) defi nition of watchdog journalism and Hughes ' (2006) criteria measuring watchdog components of a broader civic journalism concept in order to operationalize watchdog reporting. Autonomy is important because the watchdog role implicitly assumes journalists have organizational and institutional independence to investigate and examine activities of government offi cials, business interests, and public institutions in order to publish accurate information in the public interest (Bennett and Serrin, 2005; Hughes, 2006; Waisbord, 2001) . Assertiveness is another hallmark of watchdog journalism, highlighting the focus on discovering, investigating and reporting information others would have kept secret. These two measures would constitute a scale measuring the degree to which mainstream news media act in a watchdog manner; scores range from no watchdog behavior to high watchdog behavior.
This study inquires how specifi c variables infl uence watchdog performance. The review of relevant literature noted that several variables infl uenced the emergence of watchdog journalism in Latin America, including ongoing processes of democratization, increasing mediatization of politics, the shifts in media economies, emergence of trend-setting publications, and internal political opposition (Waisbord, 2000) . Therefore, in order to understand the Argentine case, I chose to look at coverage beginning after the transition to democracy to the present day. How did watchdog behavior change, as Argentina moved through continued processes of democratization? One would expect scores immediately following the transition to democracy to be relatively low, compared to subsequent years. As news outlets emerge from repressive bureaucratic-authoritarianism and into democracy, gradually media would begin demonstrating different behaviors. Others have noted how the entrance of Página/12 in 1987 brought watchdog reporting to the mainstream consciousness (Waisbord, 2000) . So, other news outlets would also demonstrate more watchdog behavior in the years following 1987 than before. As the private sector blossomed and new sources of advertising revenue opened, commercial media outlets would gain more autonomy from the state, providing a positive environment for more critical reporting of state actors.
Ideologies play important roles in guiding organizational behavior. In Argentinean politics as elsewhere in Latin America, power has accumulated in the executive branch (Galperín, 2000; O'Donnell, 1994; Smulovitz and Peruzzotti, 2000) . Therefore, how does coverage shift regarding the executive, as well as other, powerful fi gures? Guiding Página/12's behavior was its ideological opposition to the neo-liberal policies and accumulation of executive power favored by the Menem administration; Página/12 had presented a leftist political stance from inception and openly declared its ideology (Anguita, 2002; Hughes, 2006) . La Nación, with its conservative economic editorial line, would not be expected to be as critical during this period; nor would Clarín, historically a pragmatic centrist. But by 2005, media engagement in watchdog journalism would ostensibly be affected by impacts on media economies by economic crisis and political shifts. Investigative arms were cut and personnel reorganized as media struggled to emerge from bankruptcy crises. Watchdog organizations focused on providing societal accountability and protecting civil liberties largely abandoned the watchdog role. To what degree were watchdog behaviors subordinated to ideological ones?
I measured watchdog journalism from newspaper accounts from Página/12 and its two principal competitors during the 1990s, La Nación and Clarín, to understand whether these suppositions held true. Did watchdog reporting increase and decrease in mainstream news in expected ways? The hypotheses guiding this chapter are: Units of analysis are newspaper front-page news accounts, not including opinion columns, sports and other entertainment, or foreign news. Newspapers, rather than broadcast or cable coverage, were chosen to represent media coverage, for several reasons. First, they still set the agenda for other media in Argentina (Rodríguez-Yebra, 2006; Waisbord, 1994 Waisbord, , 2004 . Second, these papers have received far more offi cial advertising pesos from the Argentine government than have other print media, radio, or television channels in 2005.
3 And fi nally, it was in print media that mainstream watchdog journalism fi rst emerged, in the daily Página/12.
The newspapers chosen refl ect a purposive sample of the entire universe of Argentine dailies, as they are considered 'prestige' newspapers and represent the opinions of political elites. Further, these newspapers encompass a signifi cant portion of the country's print media coverage, with each representing different market sizes and sectors (see Table 1 ). The Spanish-language newspaper with the highest penetration in the world, Clarín had both the largest circulation and largest portion of state advertising in 2005, with La Nación in second place. Página/12 is not monitored through the Instituto Verifi cador de Circulaciones [Verifying Institute of Circulations, or IVC] but other sources have put its average daily circulation at between 15,000 -30,000 per day (Rodríguez-Yebra, 2006) . Taken together, the three newspapers represented 70 percent of total daily newspaper circulation in the fi rst half of 2005. 4 As discussed earlier, each is different ideologically, as well. But ownership patterns also refl ect differences. La Nación has remained largely under family control since inception, and the company La Nación S.A. has not bought into broadcast media (Rodríguez-Yebra, 2006) . Clarín, on the other hand, forms part of the behemoth Grupo Clarín media group. Página/12 is a much smaller entity, and its ownership status remains questionable. Claims that the parent Clarín company bought it in the mid 1990s have been refuted by the newspaper.
The sample was constructed as follows. A 10-day period was constructed for each year, 5 and years were sampled in fi ve-year increments beginning in 1985, up to 2005. Dates of editions were selected using random selection with replacement for each year. Since Página/12 emerged in 1987, only Clarín and La Nación were sampled in 1985, and serve as a baseline for pre-Página/12 entry. The front page of each newspaper was analyzed, as well as the continuation of stories appearing on the front page for tabloid newspapers. Articles regarding sports or other entertainment, or strictly international news was not coded, as the intent was to study how domestic power actors are treated.
The autonomy measure was operationalized in two ways: as featuring criticism of powerful actors in politics, military, business, etc; and demonstrating a negative or balanced tone about the principal actor in the article. Decisions to cover a principal actor refl ect the importance, or public interest, in what that actor is doing. However, the principal actor is not necessarily a traditional power actor in Argentine society. Therefore, when powerful actors are mentioned in the text, how they were treated constituted the second measure.
The assertiveness measure was also dually operationalized, in terms of agenda-setting and reporting style. When the article reported on a staged event, or listed a press conference as the main source of information, the newspaper was permitting an outside actor to set the agenda. But when the article covered the topic by seeking out numerous perspectives or taking a confl icting angle, then the newspaper was setting the agenda. Assertive reporting styles used multiple sources to actively seek out information on any particular topic, including personal interviews on critical subjects or opinion polls. When the item simply covers a staged event, such as a press conference, an outside actor is setting the media agenda.
Once the coding was completed, I recoded measures in order to form a 5-point watchdog scale ranging from 0 (not watchdog) to 4 (extremely watchdog). In order to form the watchdog scale I recoded the measures to refl ect the presence or absence of autonomy (Scott's pi = 0.78) and assertiveness (Scott's pi = 0.86) in the article. Watchdog reporting also concentrates a critical eye on high-level actors and issues. So I recoded the variable regarding the principal actor of the story to refl ect the presence or absence of criticism of executive level actors (Scott's pi = 0.99), and then again recoded it to refl ect the presence or absence of criticism of non-executive branch actors, such as Congress or the judiciary (Scott's pi = 0.99) These measures were then summed to form the watchdog scale (see Figure 1) . A score of 0 would mean neither dimension was present; a score of four would mean both were present. The scale ranged from not watchdog (score = 0) to extremely watchdog (score = 4).
Three people coded articles. Reliability was attended to as follows. Pretests were conducted to check category reliability and inter-coder reliability. A subsample of 100 articles was initially double-coded to check the plausibility of categories and inter-coder reliability. Minor adjustments were made to the protocol. An Argentine national coded 100 percent and I coded 20 percent 
Results
In all, 957 articles were coded from 150 newspaper covers. Clarín articles represented 29 percent of the total; La Nación, 35 percent; and Página/12, 36 percent. Of those, articles regarding sports or other entertainment, or news strictly about international events were not coded beyond the recording of their headline and the story subject. The total number of articles coded for autonomy and assertiveness was 561. Means were calculated for watchdog scores for each newspaper per year. Patterns of change were seen, on aggregate. Low scores in 1985 were the lowest of all the years, and scores rose in the 1990s, only to fall again in 2005. The total mean scores can be seen in Figure 2 .
Obviously, change has occurred across time. Average total mean watchdog scores were the lowest (M = 0.91; SD = 1.46) in 1985, providing support for the idea that in the early years following the return to democracy after the violent Dirty War, news media did not immediately blossom as monitors of powerful societal actors. A sharp jump in 1990 also supports previous research that posited the entrance of Página/12 into the market, the shift to neo-liberal economic policies, and continuing democratization provide a fertile environment for more democratic media performance. However, from 1995 to 2005, fl uctuations in mean scores occurred, with a larger decrease seen in 2005. Because the distribution of scores on the watchdog scale did not form a normal distribution, nor did they form a symmetric one, chi-squares were used. Chi-square tests of Watchdog Scores between time periods found a statistically signifi cant differences in scores-χ 2 (16, N = 561) = 39.86, p ≤ 0.001-and the null hypothesis was rejected. Figure 3 represents the comparison of mean scores for the three newspapers across time, and one can see the similarity to the trends represented by percentages of the presence or absence of watchdog articles over time (N = 561, SD = 1.46).
The fi rst hypothesis asked if mean watchdog scores for La Nación and Clarín were the lowest of all other scores in order to test if Página/12 was, in fact, the lead watchdog performer over time. The papers' mean scores are below Página/12 until 2005.
Clarín scores registered an increase from 1985 levels, but then showed uneven performance during the 1990s and into the 21st century (N = 164; SD = 1.43). The path shown here is one of initial adjustment in 1990 after democratization and new market competition, followed by no signifi cant changes during the 1990s.
La Nación followed a different path. The scores show a trend of moderately increasing watchdog scores from a low of 0.93 in 1985 to 1.75 in 2005. No year registered a decrease, compared to the previous year's score. As in the case of Clarín, the 1985 scores were the lowest, providing support for the second hypothesis: that 1985 scores will be the lowest of all the years for the two newspapers. Modest gains were made each year in overall watchdog reporting. While the scores never reached 'moderately watchdog' on the watchdog scale, again, no reversals were seen over time (N = 232, SD = 1.44).
Página/12 represents a different pattern than either of the other two (N = 165, SD = 1.42). Scores for Página/12 in 1985 obviously are not available, Figure 3 Change in mean watchdog scores for the three newspapers across time as the daily formed in 1987. But by 1990, the daily's mean scores clearly show it to have higher watchdog scores than either Clarín or La Nación. That pattern continued at each point of measurement, but abruptly ended in 2005, when scores dived well below those of Clarín or La Nación. Therefore, the second hypothesis -that Página/12 will have higher mean scores than La Nación or Clarín until 2005 -is supported.
The results can be seen in Table 2 , sketching the general path each newspaper followed, in terms of changes in direction of watchdog reporting over time.
The third and fourth hypotheses dealt with how media treated the president and executive branch actors, as they represent powerful actors in Argentine politics (Amplios poderes, 2004; El gobierno, 2006; Levitsky and Murillo, 2005) . Recent reports have accused the Argentine media of yielding to administration demands for positive coverage. Is this something observed in the data? How did criticism of these actors change, as administrations changed and environmental variables shifted? Figure 4 details the change. Critical coverage did increase after 1985, but began to level off in the mid-1990s, and then decreased sharply by 2005 (χ 2 (4, N = 561) = 11.98, p ≤ 0.05). Therefore, the third and fourth hypotheses -that criticism of executive branch actors will increase then decrease -is only partially supported.
The content analysis provides support for recent claims that watchdog journalism is disappearing from mainstream news. The question then becomes, why has watchdog coverage disappeared from mainstream coverage? In particular, why has critical coverage of the executive shifted so dramatically in the original watchdog innovator, Página/12? Those are the research questions guiding the next section.
Interview method and selection
In May and June 2006, I interviewed media managers, media analysts, and working investigative journalists and editors in order to better understand why watchdog journalism was disappearing from mainstream news. The participants were selected using a snowball sample. I targeted investigative journalists, political reporters and editors from well-known, national outlets based in Buenos Aires; members and executives from journalist associations; and media analysts from public and private universities who had published research on media systems and journalism. Potential participants were contacted via telephone and email. Responses and comments were analyzed using the constant comparative method to look for common themes (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) .
The content analysis had demonstrated a decrease in watchdog reporting, even as media economies were in processes of recovery. Therefore, I was particularly interested in their perceptions regarding the infl uence of factors operating at the organizational and institutional levels, and across several levels. What variables would affect watchdog reporting, from the perspectives of newsroom actors engaged in production of the news? How have mediastate relations changed in recent years? How do those factors compare in relative infl uence across the three media examined in this study, and what do they signify for the prospects of watchdog journalism?
Interview results
From those interviews, data supported partial explanations of why watchdog journalism is on the decline in Argentina. The interviews yielded data that supported Hughes' (2006) fi ndings of the role of economic crisis and ideological affi nity, worsened by, in some cases, low levels of professionalization and journalistic autonomy in newsrooms. But they also exposed data supporting the role of government news management techniques that capitalized on these environmental and institutional level factors with astonishing success.
Ideological affi nities, in the respondents' views, proscribed watchdog functions. Partisan interests superceded over-arching commitments to truthtelling in cases that the partisan elite would not want to be published. This was especially true in the case of Página/12, which had been founded on the twin towers of ideology and watchdog norms. As one respondent put it, 'now we discover [Página/12] didn't do it for a watchdog function, they did it for an ideological question. ' Financial interests, public opinion and private sector alliances also were cited as perceived reasons for censorship of elite criticism. A sense of public scandal fatigue also worked to lower the extent to which publication of fi ndings of investigative reporting would be profi table. Responses indicated that business interests responded to change in public opinion and private sector interests, as owners and editors censored material that could hurt corporate interests, and published material that could help it:
Here the reality is that there are some themes that are not published because they go against the editorial line or the interests of the business….Here, there is much business censorship; this cannot be published. Then, it's not that they're going to tell you 'this can't be published,' it's a theme that for example damages the government. 'No, wait, get more sources,' they send you to the freezer. They leave you there, as we say in Spanish, durmiendo el sueño de los justos.
6
But political environments were also quite different, and this also affected watchdog performance. Responses delineated various political factors that were perceived as key initiators to setting off media publications of scandals, and described how changes in the relations between political actors, the media, and media owners have affected how the elite are investigated in Argentina.
Changing media-state relations
The interviews detailed strategies on the part of the administration that have created strong incentives for support of the offi cial agenda. Tactics can be broadly grouped into two divisions, operating on different levels. First, tactics aimed at the organization newsrooms include the strategic use of information and requests for personnel reshuffl ing. Strategies in the institutional fi eld include incentives for support, with both positive economic and regulatory reinforcement and negative reinforcement in the form of diminution of media credibility.
Strategic control of information capitalizes on newsroom routines, and in some cases, weak autonomy of editorial concerns and low levels of professionalization. It consists of several components: centralization of offi cial information channels, restriction of access to those channels, and acquiescence with demands to hold publication of critical stories, all of which journalists note that have increased under Kirchner. Strategic information control relates to the studies cataloguing newsroom dependence on offi cial sources (Sigal, 1973) . Journalists depend on information from political actors, and closely follow lines of offi cial debate.
7 When elite debate is marked by many different perspectives, competition to get one's voice heard gives journalists an advantage. But when elite cohesion proscribes dissenting views, and access to the dominant view is restricted, access and information become strategic tools used to motivate positive coverage and punish criticism. Responses indicated this was the case in recent years:
The discourse of the government to the outside is a monolithic discourse.
Kirchner handles the government with three people. He does not do cabinet meetings. For the journalists it is very diffi cult to fi nd out exclusive information, because very few people handle it.
The second factor deals with perceptions of incentive structures proffered to media organizations to facilitate compliance with adhesion to the political agenda. These incentives exist for various levels of news organizational hierarchies, and include the idea that media-state ties have been reconfi gured to refl ect the power the state has in regulatory and fi nancial fi elds. Responses indicated the perception that offi cial advertising and favorable regulatory decisions were 'conditioning' media owners to give favorable treatment to the Kirchner administration:
And there is a government that has a powerful infl uence on the media, that has agreements, very serious and in my opinion very worrying ones with most of the mainstream media. Agreements that are not written, though they have a certain control on the information of those media. Or they generate a certain pact that involves offi cial advertising, and the unwritten or non-documented threats of the government when facing the renewing of a license, of calling on private companies to not advertise on certain programs, or in certain magazines or newspapers.
Discussion and conclusions
The content analysis demonstrated that observable changes have taken place in mainstream watchdog reporting. While not approaching levels initially observed after the return to democracy, scores had decreased from higher levels in the 1990s. Therefore, results did not contradict the arguments that traditional mainstream outlets increased their investigative journalism as democratization process continued in the 1990s, neo-liberal policies created a thriving private sector, internal political wrangling created an atmosphere ripe for 'politics by other means' and watchdog newcomers like Página/12 created a competitive atmosphere and spurred changes in other media. Mainstream outlets created investigative arms within organizations, and investigative journalism became almost a brand for various media that had not always engaged in it previously.
Differences were also observed in terms of coverage of executive-branch actors. The general trend was one of increasing criticism through 2000, but a decline in criticism by 2005. Página/12 was perhaps the biggest contributor to the decline, as levels fell to zero by the last measured year. On aggregate, by 2005, there was a decline in watchdog journalism across the three newspapers. Modest increases in watchdog journalism leveled off at Clarín and slowed in La Nación. Página/12 scores declined to almost a third of what they were 15 years earlier. Again, this observation does not contradict the argument that economic crisis would impact media performance. As Argentina entered into a state of economic, social and political emergency from 2001 to 2003, overall watchdog scores provide some degree of support for the idea that newsrooms cut investigative arms, crunched resources, and reorganized personnel as the private sector shrunk and media debt ballooned. But the largest portion of the decrease was due to the performance of one newspaper, Página/12. The other two newspapers in the sample held relatively steady throughout the crisis.
What factors, then, would explain these declines? Economic crisis cannot be the single explanatory factor, as Página/12 engaged in watchdog behavior in the late 1980s, when Argentina was drowning in hyper-infl ation. Nor is democracy a suffi cient condition for watchdog behavior, as the 2005 results show. Rather, variables operating in the external and internal environments of news production processes impact media performance. The Argentine case illustrates the interaction between shifts in media performance and internal organizational mechanisms working to guide news production.
Media-state relations can be in constant states of negotiation. During certain periods, in certain conditions, watchdog journalism on the political elite can be subsumed to organizational interests. Responses given in the interviews indicate that Argentine journalists' have been largely experiencing changes in how they are able to work. Most, although not all, described pressures on them from business interests, changes in public opinion, ideologies, and government news management strategies to temper coverage regarding the political elite. These factors are especially powerful in an environment of institutional weakness, economic vulnerability, and political elite cohesion.
This supports the assertion that in order to understand scandal publications, one must look at the factors behind publication, to the mechanics of organizational routines and ideologies, and relations with elite actors (Tumber and Waisbord, 2004; Waisbord, 1994 Waisbord, , 2004 . The responses also provide a link between the watchdog functions of uncovering and publishing highlevel corruption to what Waisbord (2004 Waisbord ( : 1082 has called 'the institutional architecture of scandals'.
I posit that declines in watchdog performance represent transformations on several levels (see Figure 5) , as well as the interaction between shifts in the external environment, and ongoing processes within media organizations. First, environment shocks initially worked to reduce space for watchdog reporting. In particular, the economic crisis of 2001 reduced the size of the private sector, exacerbated already steep declines in circulation, and increased dependence on government advertising for smaller and provincial outlets. Mainstream print outlets had huge external debts, crushed by the peso devaluation of 70 percent, and the elimination of the legal clause that exempted newspapers from paying the VAT of 21 percent of their value (Rodríguez-Yebra, 2006) . The private sector collapsed, and took with it much of the advertising for media; ADEPA estimated that it fell 40 percent in 2002 to its lowest value in 10 years (quoted in Rodríguez-Yebra, 2006: 24) .
Into this environment came President Kirchner, who assumed executive power in 2003 with scarcely 22 percent of the vote. Yet he has become one of the most powerful and popular elected heads of Argentina in history. From his meager public opinion rating in 2002, poll readings now put public propensity to vote for him at well over 50 percent (Kollmann, 2006) . The country's economic outlook continued to improve; gross domestic product grew by about 9 percent each year from 2003 to 2005, boosted by external conditions, internal demand and strong exportation. But even as the economy improved and democracy stabilized and deepened, investigative reporting did not return to mainstream consciousness in the manner it did during the 1990s. Innovative watchdog units abandoned their critical lens.
Responses highlight the infl uence of forces operating across organizational and institutional fi elds. Media organizations responded to the environmental shocks and shifts in media-state relations in disparate ways. For some, ideological commitments of vanguard watchdog organizations were not subordinated to watchdog functions, but rather the reverse. Página/12 declared its affi nity to the human rights focus of Kirchner's government. Other newspapers followed different routes. Clarín, after initial adjustments when Página/12 fi rst entered the market, did not make any further commitment to watchdog journalism. Its stagnant watchdog reporting may simply refl ect reaccommodation of organizational interests in a post-Página/12 environment. La Nación, on the other hand, continued to make minor advancements in watchdog reporting over time, but no great gains, even as the organization's conservative economic stance was at odds with Néstor Kirchner's administration's.
The nexus between professionalization, a blurry line between editorial values and commercial interests, and media businesses in economic crisis also emerged from the data. Business interests such as maintaining friendly relations with advertisers, winning public approval and obtaining favorable regulatory decisions forced change in several directions. Corporate interests of media conglomerates would silence reporting that could ostensibly hurt those interests, and that included political support, affi liations, and economic actors. Responses indicated that they most associated this with Clarín, a holding of the media giant Grupo Clarín, with many more corporate interconnections than La Nación. Business interests also pushed reporting, in some cases, towards the opposite pole. During the 1990s, with the success of Página/12, other news outlets formed investigative units and engaged in watchdog reporting in order to compete, and establish watchdog journalism as a company brand. After the 2001 crisis, perceptions of declining public opinion of media credibility were perceived to act in another direction, however, as some respondents in-dicated some media struggled to rebuild their investigative 'brand' after poor performance during the De la Rúa debacle.
Finally, a systematic application of strategic media relations by government offi cials has capitalized on changes in media environments -such as drops in public perception of media credibility, high public approval of government actors, and greater reliance on state funds and aid -and targets multiple levels of organizational hierarchies, including individual change agents. When incentive structures are created in situations of weak institutions and high uncertainty, politicians may exploit environmental conditions by utilizing news media management techniques that can help them achieve strategic goals (Bennett and Livingston, 2003; Cook, 1998; Levitsky and Murillo, 2005; Pfetsch, 1998) . Interviews supported the perception that incentive structuresarbitrary awarding of state advertising, regulatory decisions in decree form (such as extensions of broadcast licenses), and access to prized sources of highlevel information -have been created to encourage media coverage supporting the administration's political agenda.
The case of Argentina presents compelling questions for media scholars. Is Argentina a paradox, or is it an instance of declining watchdog performance that could easily travel to other new democracies where partisan models of media performance have organically developed and historically existed, where economic crisis is a factor in media economies, and where media have an increasingly central role in politics? What implications does the Argentine case have for democratic media function in Latin America?
The fi ndings here indicate that the Argentine case is a salient one to understand changes in media performance when journalists must work in contexts of high uncertainty and instability, little infrastructure or support for the practice, instrumentalization of media for particularist gain, and historical tendencies to organize information in clientelistic or quid pro quo manners -trends witnessed elsewhere in Latin America (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002; Hughes, 2006; Hughes and Lawson, 2005) . A lack of information infrastructure provides impetus for state actors to treat information as a commodity, rewarding or punishing coverage by providing leaks, or denying access to information. Argentina, like other Latin American nations, provides little workable access to information laws, and a dearth of state resources available to archive and manage state information (Farmelo, 2003) . Journalists' access to state information is often limited to the degree to which elite actors will speak to them, widening the probability that forms of conditioning would take place. When state discourse becomes a 'monolithic discourse' and journalists must count on personal relationships rather than access to databases, archives, press conferences or interviews to produce news stories, then such an environment becomes one ripe for clientelistic relations. Strategic control of information by state actors, in its current form in Argentina, could easily carry over to other nations with similar contexts. Reports of pressure from editors and advertisers resulting in self-censorship, corruption or other content shifts has been reported elsewhere in the region.
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How journalists navigate the highly uncertain waters of investigating the same elites their bosses are depending upon for advertising revenue and favorable regulatory decisions has also been of concern across Latin America, where states retain formidable means of indirect control over the media. Argentina's Página/12 initially proved that outlets can have considerable infl uence, even on a small budget and in confl ict with powerful state actors. Yet the nexus of ideologies, political affi nities, and business interests resulted with differing consequences for organizational commitments to watchdog reporting. The Argentine case presents compelling evidence that organizational calculus favoring corporate interests, management ideologies or political affi nities pushes reporting in varying directions, given similar economic and political climates. In environments of intensifying concen-tration, oligarchic ownership patterns, and strategic partnerships, owners and managers protect their holdings within the understood 'rules of the game'. When will from upper management favored hard-hitting, critical reporting of powerful actors and power actors gained from strategically leaking infor-mation to harm rivals, publications and investigations were facilitated to an unprecedented degree. When that will faded and information was only selectively released to 'friendly' outlets, watchdog journalism disappeared.
In conclusion, watchdog journalism in its many forms will always encounter powerful obstacles, in the forms of hostile business or political climates, weak professionalization, and perhaps apathy on the part of its audience. Yet serving the public interest requires a clearer understanding of the role of watchdog reporting in society. Debates within newsrooms regarding the use and power of sources in stories, diversity in media, and the role of organizational ideologies in determining media agendas could serve to delineate democratic responsibilities. More resources for journalists in the form of transparency mechanisms, legal protections, and education to improve understanding of investigative practices and ethics could fortify the quality of reporting. Finally, a push for independent bodies or public commissions that could help with oversight and accountability issues would serve to bolster public perception of media and political institutions, as well as clarify the actual and normative parameters of media-state relations in terms of all democratic stakeholders.
Notes
1 Partisan media models were developed from primarily European infl uences in Latin America, where media were developed to advocate a particular political view. In contrast, the commercial model took hold as US infl uences in the form of associations, new technologies, and journalism education fl owed into the region. Authoritarian models developed as authoritarian regimes viewed media as mechanisms to instill governmental propaganda and maintain the political and economic status quo. (Hughes, 2006; McQuail, 1992) . Relatively close on the continuum to authoritarian media systems are developmental media systems, where media operate outside of the state, but always for the 'good of the state'; dissenting views are considered wasteful and subversive and media are seen as state-building tools because of their important roles in socializing the public (Hachten, 1992 (Hughes, 2006) . 5 Initially, a 14 day period was to be constructed. However, because of the diffi culty of obtaining complete front pages with article continuations for dates across newspapers, the most that could be constructed was 10 days. The newspapers were kept in paper form at the Library of Congress in boxes that the public could peruse. This created diffi culties when trying to obtain a single date across three newspapers, especially for the 1985 and 1995 dates. For 2000 dates, articles were sometimes available in online archives. 6 A phrase roughly meaning, 'to keep them quiet'. 7 See also Bennett's (1990) Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002; Hughes, 2006; and Hughes and Lawson, 2005. 
